CC-0. In Public Domain. Digitization by Agam Nigam. Funding Tattva Heritage Foundation, Kolkatta and IKS-MOE

Wiener Zeitschrift für die Kunde Süd- und Ostasiens und Archiv für indische Philosophie, IX, 1965

134

pattiḥ (YS I, 41—50) which in contraposition to the former does not differ typologically from the *saṃyamaḥ* as described in YS II, 54—III, 7. The *samādhiḥ* of the Nirodhayoga may possibly be called a „natural mysticism", while the *samāpattiḥ* represents only a method to „appropriate" existentially a certain belief or truth being a part of a philosophical or theological system. Thus the *samāpattiḥ* having no real object, but only representations and ideas, i. e. finite contents of cognition, cannot be called a mystical experience. The *samādhiḥ* of the Nirodhayoga on the contrary — not the *samādhiḥ* of the *saṃyamaḥ* — is a meditation of a completely different structure. In it the cognition transcending all finite objects in direction of the „Being", which as „sky-line" of cognition is a necessary apriori of each act of cognition, reaches this very „Being" in a sort of direct experience, since every content of the act of cognition is eliminated, in spite of the fact that this „Being" on principle can never become the explicit object of human cognition.

THE TESTIMONY OF THE YUKTIDĪPIKĀ CONCERNING THE ĪŚVARA DOCTRINE OF THE PĀŚUPATAS AND VAIŚEṢIKAS

13

By George Chemparathy

The history of the origin and early development of the doctrine of Īśvara in the theistic systems of Indian philosophy is for us still shrouded in mystery and uncertainty. The Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika systems, which were avowedly theistic at least from about the second half of the sixth century A. D. and which later became the leading protagonists of theism among the philosophical systems, do not seem to have given in their early stages a place for Īśvara, which he later on came to occupy in these systems. The materials that are come down to us from the early stages of these schools, more especially of the Vaiśeṣika school, are so scanty, that the historian, who would like to trace the beginnings and early development of the doctrine of Īśvara in these systems, has to depend very much on the information given in the literature of other schools in order to trace, at least in broad outlines, the processes and stages of the development of the doctrine. Such references to the Īśvara doctrine of the Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika systems in the literature of the other schools are unfortunately not very numerous, especially with regard to the early stages, say before the sixth century A. D., since the earlier literature of the Indian philosophical systems in general are come down to us only in a few cases. Hence it is extremely important to gather and study these scattered informations on the doctrine of Īśvara, and with their help reconstruct the history of the origin and development of the doctrine of Īśvara in the philosophical systems, which we are not able to learn directly from the works belonging to these systems. Such a method, no doubt, has many drawbacks and disadvantages and might not offer us that grade of certainty which we might have had from the study of the works proper to the schools, but due to the inadequacy of direct materials it is the only way that is open to us.

In the literature that has hitherto appeared on the doctrine of

Center for Shaiva Studies, Pondicherry Collection

CC-0. In Public Domain. Digitization by Agam Nigam. Funding Tattva Heritage Foundation, Kolkatta and IKS-MOE

Īśvara in the Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika systems [1] the scattered fragments or references to the doctrine of Īśvara have not always merited from the scholars the attention they deserve. This is partly due to the fact that many of the fragments on the Īśvara doctrine have been accessible to us only since less than a decade, and partly due to the fact that their presence can be detected only by one, who has gone through a vast amount of Indian philosophic literature. Under these circumstances it will take still more time before most or all of these fragments are sought out, collected and examined into. In this paper I would like to bring to the notice of the scholars a passage from the Yuktidīpikā, where the doctrine of Īśvara of the Pāśupatas [2] and the Vaiśeṣikas is referred to and discussed in some detail. The Īśvara doctrine of the Pāśupatas is very important in the history of the origin and development of the Īśvara doctrine of the Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika, because it seems to have played a very important role in the origin and development of the Īśvara doctrine in general, and of these two systems in particular.

The Yuktidīpikā, one of the most important of the older commentaries to the Sāṃkhyakārikā of Īśvarakṛṣṇa, is a polemic work, whose authorship is not yet known with certainty [3]. External testimony concerning the date of the Yuktidīpikā is hitherto unknown, and consequently we are left with the intrinsic evidence of the text to judge of its date. An intrinsic analysis of the text has led Prof. E. Frauwallner to place the date of the Yuktidīpikā to about 550 A. D. [4].

[1] The more recent contributions to the study of the Īśvara doctrine of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika system are:

Bhattacharyya, G.: Studies in Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika Theism. Calcutta 1961 (= Calcutta Sanskrit College Research Series, No. XIV, Studies No. 5).

Steinkellner, E.: Augenblicklichkeitsbeweis und Gottesbeweis bei Śaṅkarasvāmin. Diss. Vienna 1963.

Chemparathy, G.: Aufkommen und Entwicklung der Lehre von einem höchsten Wesen in Nyāya und Vaiśeṣika. Diss. Vienna 1963.

[2] Two recent contributions to the Īśvara doctrine of the Pāśupatas may be mentioned here. They are:

Schultz, F. A.: Die philosophisch-theologischen Lehren des Pāśupata-Systems nach dem Pañcārthabhāṣya und der Ratnaṭīkā. Walldorf-Hessen 1958 (= Beiträge zur Sprach- und Kulturgeschichte des Orients, hrsg. von O. Spies, Heft 10).

Hara, Minoru: Nakulīśa-Pāśupata-Darśanam. Indo-Iranian Journal, Vol. II (1958), Nr. 1, pp. 8—32.

[3] B. Gupta has suggested, on the basis of the close resemblance of a passage in Nyāyamañjarī (Kāshī Sanskrit Series, No. 106, p. 100, 17—18) attributed to a certain Rāja with a passage in the Yuktidīpikā (p. 42, 21—22), that the Rāja mentioned in the Nyāyamañjarī is identical with the author of the Yuktidīpikā. (Cf. B. Gupta: Die Wahrnehmungslehre in der Nyāyamañjarī, Diss. Bonn 1962, pp. 22 and 39.) This hypothesis of B. Gupta may be corroborated by another argument, that in the Sāṃkhyatattvakaumudī, a commentary of Vācaspati Miśra to the Sāṃkhyakārikas, Vācaspati quotes, while commenting on Kārikā 72, three verses from a Rājavārttikam, which are found in the Yuktidīpikā with but two negligible variations (*mūlikārthāḥ* in Yuktidīpikā, *maulikārthāḥ* in Sāṃkhyatattvakaumudī and *aṣṭābhiḥ* in Yuktidīpikā, *aṣṭabhiḥ* in Sāṃkhyatattvakaumudī) Cf. Yuktidīpikā, p. 2, 1—6.

The text of the Yuktidīpikā (hereafter abbr. YD) was edited by P. Chakravarti (= Calcutta Sanskrit Series No. XXIII, Calcutta 1938) on the basis of a single manuscript, parts of which were missing. The edition has unfortunately not been free from errors and inaccuracies. Prof. V. Raghavan has published some corrections of the text in: Annals of Oriental Research of the University of Madras, under the title: The Yuktidīpikā on the Sāṃkhyakārikā: Corrections and Emendations in the text. Cf. Vol. XII (1954—55), pp. 1—14; Another series of corrections and emendations were published by the same author in the same journal, Vol. XIV (1957—58), pp. 1—8; Vol. XV (1958—59), pp. 1—12; pp. 1—10. These corrections were not based on any new Mss., but in the words of the author, "suggested themselves to me during my further study of the text".

[4] E. Frauwallner: Geschichte der indischen Philosophie, Band I (Salzburg 1953), p. 287.

[5] On the nature of *vīta* and *avīta* forms of inference. Cf. YD, 47, 13ff. An explanation is given in the following verse of the YD (p. 47, 9—10):

yadā hetuḥ svarūpeṇa sādhyasiddhau prayujyate /
sa vīto 'rthāntarākṣepād itaraḥ pariśeṣitaḥ //

I. The Context

The doctrine of Īśvara is discussed in the Yuktidīpikā in the following context. The author of the Yuktidīpikā commenting on the Sāṃkhyakārikā, kā. 15, proves the existence of the unmanifested principle (*avyaktam*) as the cause of the manifested universe (*vyaktam*) by means of five direct or positive (*vīta*) arguments. Having thus demonstrated his doctrine concerning the origin of the visible universe, he turns his attention to the theories of other schools in order to show their untenability and thereby demonstrate by means of indirect (*avīta*) arguments [5]

Center for Shaiva Studies, Pondicherry Collection

CC-0. In Public Domain. Digitization by Agam Nigam. Funding Tattva Heritage Foundation, Kolkatta and IKS-MOE

that his theory alone is faultless. The opposite theories mentioned by the Yuktidīpikākāra postulate as cause of the universe the Atoms (*paramāṇuḥ*), Soul (*puruṣaḥ*), Īśvara, Deeds (*karma*), Destiny (*daivam*), Nature (*svabhāvaḥ*), Time (*kālaḥ*), Chance (*yadṛcchā*) and Non-being (*abhāvaḥ*) [6]. The author of the Yuktidīpikā then takes up each of these theories, one after the other, and shows their untenability as cause of the universe [7]. It is worthy of note that of these theories the first two, namely those that postulate the atoms and Īśvara respectively as the cause of the universe, are dealt with at greater length than the others. Of these two, the theory that Īśvara is the cause of the universe is dealt with at greater length than the other. This fact suggests that the Īśvara theory was, in the view of the author of the Yuktidīpikā, the most to be refuted, either because it had a greater number of followers, or because it was a doctrine that was gaining ground more rapidly, and consequently it had to be refuted at greater length and with greater emphasis.

The refutation of Īśvara as the cause of the visible universe is immediately preceded by a very concise refutation of the theory that the

---

Further on: *avītasya hi lakṣaṇam pariśeṣataḥ sādhyānugrahaḥ* (YD, 51, 15). Thus *vīta* argument can be said to be the direct demonstration of one's thesis by positive arguments, while the *avīta* form of argument is that by means of which the arguments of the opponents are shown to be untenable and by exclusion of their arguments one's own thesis is established as the only correct one. For further information on the *vīta* and *avīta* forms of inference in Sāṃkhya cf. E. Frauwallner: Die Erkenntnislehre des klassischen Sāṃkhya-Systems, in: Wiener Zeitschrift für die Kunde Süd- und Ostasiens und Archiv für indische Philosophie, Bd. II (1958), p. 8ff.

[6] Cf. YD, 82, 4—5.

[7] The refutation of each of these theories can be found in the following passages of the YD:

Paramāṇus:	82,16—84,23.
Puruṣa:	84,24—26.
Īśvara:	84,27—88,5.
Karma:	88,6 —25.
Daiva:	88,25—26.
Kāla:	88,27—89,9.
Yadṛchā:	89,10—12.
Abhāva:	89,13—14.

Puruṣa is the cause of the universe. The Yuktidīpikākāra rejects this theory on the ground, that the Puruṣa is by nature inactive and consequently he cannot be a doer (*kartā*) [8], and immediately passes on to the refutation of the Īśvara theory with the remark: "In refuting Īśvara as cause (of the universe) the same principle is to be followed, since he is not different from the Puruṣa" [9]. With this remark the author of the Yuktidīpikā wants to point out that the doctrine of Īśvara as cause of the universe is to be rejected, because Īśvara belongs to the same domain as Puruṣa and hence he cannot be a doer, in the very same way as the Puruṣa. It is against this argument of the Yuktidīpikākāra that the view of the Pāśupatas and Vaiśeṣikas, who assert that there is indeed such an Īśvara who is the cause of the universe, is brought forward and discussed.

---

[8] Cf. Sāṃkhyakārikā 19. Commenting on this the author of the YD explains that the Puruṣa is *akartā* in a sevenfold manner (YD., 103, 20—30), which he sums up in the following verse:

nādhyavasāyaṃ kurute puruṣo naiva sthitiṃ prayogaṃ vā /
na svātmano na parato nāvyapadeśāt na cobhayataḥ //

The Sāṃkhya seems to have conceived activity as incompatible with *cetanatvam* and *anāmiśrarūpatvam* as the following words of the YDkāra suggest: *katham asya (= puruṣasya) niṣkriyatvam iti cet? caitanyatvāt. acetanānāṃ hi kṣīrādīnāṃ kriyāvatvam upalabdhaṃ, cetanasya na kasyacid ity ato niṣkriyaḥ puruṣaḥ. Kiñca anāmiśrarūpatvāt. āmiśrarūpaṃ hi kriyādimat kṣīrādi, anāmiśrarūpaś cāyam. tasmān niṣkriyaḥ.* YD., 103, 7—9. It is hence that the Sāṃkhya relegates the whole domain of activity to the Pradhānam, which is *acetanam* and *āmiśrarūpam*; for Pradhānam consists of the three Guṇas, *sattvam*, *rajaḥ* and *tamaḥ*, to which ultimately all activities are ascribed: *guṇāś ca kartāro, na puruṣaḥ* (YD., 103, 29—30). The Puruṣa is essentially inactive (*akartā*); he can be said to be *kartā* only in a metaphorical sense (*bhaktyā*, YD., 104, 9; 104, 23), but not in the true sense of the word (*na paramārthataḥ*, YD., 104, 9—10). The view that a *cetana*-being cannot be a *kartā* or *kriyāvān* may strike us as strange, but we should remember that according to the Sāṃkhya there are only two kinds of *kriyā*, namely *prasparndalakṣaṇā* and *pariṇāmalakṣaṇā* (YD., 34, 5—6), both of which are impossible in the case of Puruṣa on account of his *vibhu* nature and the absence of the three Guṇas, *sattvam*, *rajaḥ* and *tamaḥ*, which are the principles of evolution.

[9] YD., 84, 27: *caitanyāviśeṣād īśvarasyāpi sa eva viddhiḥ kāraṇatvapratiṣeddhe bodhavyaḥ.*

Center for Shaiva Studies, Pondicherry Collection

CC-0. In Public Domain. Digitization by Agam Nigam. Funding Tattva Heritage Foundation, Kolkatta and IKS-MOE

II. Brief analysis and critical observations

I. Proofs for the existence of Īśvara:
1. Special products like the universe presuppose a being of superior intelligence as cause. 84, 28—85, 2.
2. The conjunction of the conscious soul with the unconscious body is effected by a conscious being. 85,2—85,6.

II. Refutation of the first proof: 85,7—86,8.
1. The Hetu needs to be proved. 85,8—85,9.
2. Prior to the activity of Pradhānam there is no intelligence (*buddhiḥ*). 85,9—85,20.
3. Being possessed of supreme power (*aiśvaryam*) Īśvara has nothing to gain by creating the universe. 85,20—85,22.
4. Īśvara has no one to direct him in his activity. 85,22—85,23.
5. The Hetu cannot lead to an absolutely certain conclusion, since trees etc. come into being without his causality. 85,23—85,26.
6. There is more unhappiness (*duḥkham*) in this world than happiness (*sukham*), and the attainment of one's aims is difficult. 85,26—86,8.

III. Refutation of the second proof: 86,8—87,13.
1. The Hetu needs to be proved. 86,8—86,13.
2. There would be a regressus in infinitum. 86,13—87,6.
3. Īśvara cannot effect the conjunction of body and soul. 87,6—87,12.

IV. Arguments against the Īśvara-doctrine of the Vaiśeṣikas.
1. Īśvara cannot be included in any of the categories admitted by the Vaiśeṣikas. 87,14—87,28.
2. Nowhere in the Sūtras has Īśvara been taught or mentioned by the Sūtrakāra. 87,28—88,5.

The discussion of the theory of Īśvara as cause of the universe is introduced with the statement: *asty evam īśvara iti pāśupatavaiśeṣikāḥ* [10]. This is followed by two formal proofs for the existence of Īśvara [11], against which the author of the Yuktidīpikā brings forward a series of objections and finally rejects as untenable [12]. The entire refutation of the two proofs is concluded with the observation: *evaṃ tāvat pāśupatānām īśvaraparigrahe doṣaḥ* [13]. With the remark: *vaiśeṣikāṇāñ cāyaṃ doṣaḥ* [14] he then passes on to refute the Īśvara doctrine of the Vaiśeṣikas,

[10] YD., 84, 28.
[11] YD., 84,28—85,2 and 85,2—6.
[12] Ibid. 85,7—86,8 and 86,8—87,12. Other references in the YD., where the rejection of Īśvara as cause of the universe is mentioned: YD., 31,8; 34,2ff.; 89,15—16; 170,24—25.
[13] Ibid. 87,12—13.
[14] Ibid. 87,14.

where he shows that the author of the Vaiśeṣikasūtras did not accept the doctrine of Īśvara, but that it was introduced by the Pāśupatas into the system. Such a way of argumentation leads us to the conclusion that the expression *pāśupataivaiśeṣikāḥ* [15] is to be taken as a Dvandva-compound, meaning „Pāśupatas and the Vaiśeṣikas", and not rather "Vaiśeṣikas who follow the Pāśupatas". Further it seems reasonable to conclude that these proofs, though they appear in formulations foreign to the Vaiśeṣika terminology, might have been accepted by the early Vaiśeṣikas as proofs for the existence of Īśvara, when, as we learn from the Yuktidīpikā, the Īśvara doctrine was accepted into the system from the Pāśupatas; for firstly, we do not see any positive proof for the existence of Īśvara brought forward by the author of the Yuktidīpikā from the side of the Vaiśeṣikas, although he tells us that they admitted the existence of Īśvara [16]. In the section of the passage, where the author of the Yuktidīpikā discusses the Īśvara doctrine of the Vaiśeṣikas, he merely shows that the Vaiśeṣikasūtrakāra did not accept Īśvara in the system and that it was an invention (*upajñam*) of the Pāśupatas [17]. If the Vaiśeṣikas did not in fact accept the proofs of the Pāśupatas, which the author of the Yuktidīpikā has brought forward in the passage, one would have expected some proofs for the existence of Īśvara also from the side of the Vaiśeṣikas [18]. Secondly, the remark of the Yuktidīpikākāra *vaiśeṣikāṇāñ cāyaṃ doṣaḥ* [19] can perhaps be better understood, if the Vaiśeṣikas of that time accepted the proofs and the doctrines concerning Īśvara as taught by the Pāśupatas, which he discusses in detail. Otherwise they could not be said to incur the faults of the Pāśupatas. Thirdly, we see that the Yuktidīpikākāra after his remark *vaiśeṣikāṇāñ cāyaṃ doṣaḥ*, deals with the refutation of the Vaiśeṣika doctrine, as though what he is going to say is a continuation of his argumentation,

[15] Ibid. 84,28.
[16] Ibid. 84,28.
[17] Ibid. 88,5.
[18] It is not impossible that the Vaiśeṣikas at the very beginning had implicitly accepted also the proofs of the existence of Īśvara as put forward by the Pāśupatas, and it was only slowly that they began to incorporate the Īśvara doctrine according to the tenets of their own system.
[19] YD., 87,14.

Center for Shaiva Studies, Pondicherry Collection

CC-0. In Public Domain. Digitization by Agam Nigam. Funding Tattva Heritage Foundation, Kolkatta and IKS-MOE

with the introducing word *kiñca*, [20], which he uses throughout his work to indicate an additional reason in his argumentation [21]. This again seems to suggest that, what has been said against the proofs of the Pāśupatas, is to be applied also to the Vaiśeṣikas. Having thus refuted the two Īśvara proofs of the Pāśupatas and Vaiśeṣikas and having showed the Vaiśeṣikas that in the opinion of their Sūtrakāra there was no Īśvara, the discussion of the Īśvara theory is concluded by the remark *tasmād īśvaro' py akāraṇam* [22].

The consideration of the two proofs for the existence of Īśvara reveal the following facts:

Firstly, the starting points of both the proofs is the observation of facts in ordinary life, such as special products like palace, chariot etc. being produced under the guidance of men of superior intelligence, and the conjunction of ox and cart being brought about by a being endowed with consciousness. Very great importance seems to have been attached to the example (*dṛṣṭāntaḥ*), and the reasoning seems to have been based more on analogy than on the logical nexus between the proving reason (*hetuḥ*) and what is to be proved (*sādhyam*). This characteristic is also observable in the refutation of the two proofs by the Yuktidīpikākāra. The developments of logical reasoning started by Dignāga and continued by his successors are not to be felt in this passage, — a fact which might point to the early date of these proofs as well as of the Yuktidīpikā.

Secondly, it is worthy of special note that neither of the proofs aims at establishing the existence of an omniscient (*sarvajña*) maker of the world. The first proof does in fact conclude to the existence of a cause that has extraordinary knowledge (*atiśayabuddhiḥ*), while the second establishes the existence of Īśvara as a merely conscious (*cetana*) cause. This fact seems to suggest that these proofs belong to a time in which the doctrine of omniscience (*sarvajñatvam*) of Īśvara had not been developed, or at least had not occupied that place of importance in the Īśvara doctrine, as it had at a later stage; otherwise the proofs, as they are adduced in the Yuktidīpikā could not have any proving

[20] Ibid. 87,14.
[21] Even a cursory glance at the YD bears out this fact.
[22] YD., 88,5.

value. Even the Yuktidīpikākāra does not seem to have been aware of this problem of the omniscience of Īśvara, since in his refutation he nowhere alludes to this defect of the proof. This strikes us as very strange, especially when we remember that at a later period — even at the time of Praśastapāda, as we know from his fragments — the omniscience of Īśvara had become an integral part of the Īśvara doctrine [23]. Perhaps the term *atiśayabuddhiḥ* implied for the author of the first proof the very same content as the term *sarvajñatvam* at a later period.

An inquiry into the source of these two proofs for the existence of Īśvara would be of great interest for the history of the doctrine of Īśvara, but up till now I have not been able to trace either of these proofs in the Pāśupata works available to us from this period. The Pāśupatasūtras [24] in themselves do not reveal much philosophical thought, as do for example, the Sūtras of Nyāya or Vaiśeṣika. It is, as far as we know, in the Pañcārthabhāṣyam, the commentary of Kauṇḍinya to the Pāśupatasūtras, that a philosophical background was given to the Pāśupatasūtras. In this commentary Kauṇḍinya speaks of the relation of Paśupati to the creature (*paśuḥ*) and it is there that we could probably find ideas which might help us to trace back the two proofs.

As for the first proof, I have not yet been able to trace any passage in the Pañcārthabhāṣyam which might correspond with it. On the other hand, there are passages in Kauṇḍinya, which seem to correspond in idea to the second proof, namely the idea that Īśvara connects the soul with the body.

After enumerating the Kāryas [25] and the Karaṇas [26] Kauṇḍinya observes: "The adorable Īśvara is the one who causes their modification.

[23] Tattvasaṃgrahapañjikā (Gaekwad's Oriental Series, No. XXX, Baroda 1926), p. 43, 23—44,2.
[24] The text used is: Pāśupata Sūtras with Pañcārthabhāṣya of Kauṇḍinya, ed. by R. Ananthakrishna Sastri, Trivandrum 1940 (= Trivandrum Sanskrit Series, No. CXLIII). (Hereafter Pañcārthabhāṣyam abbr.: PABh.)
[25] The *kāryāṇi* are: earth, water, fire, wind and ether. PABh. 74,2—3.
[26] The *karaṇāni* consist of the thirteen *indriyāṇi*: the five *karmendriyāṇi*, the five *buddhīndriyāṇi* and the three *antaḥkaraṇāni*. PABh. 74,6—7; 113,11—114,18; cf. YD., 133,27).

Center for Shaiva Studies, Pondicherry Collection

CC-0. In Public Domain. Digitization by Agam Nigam. Funding Tattva Heritage Foundation, Kolkatta and IKS-MOE

Why? Because his powers of knowledge and action are unimpeded. To be the producer of modification means the uniting of souls with the forms of the mode of being (*sthānam*), body, and objects of the senses, and according to extension, division and particularity, with the parts called Kārya and Karaṇa and with merit, knowledge, detachment, and sovereign power (as well as with their opposites) demerit, ignorance, lack of detachment and absence of supreme power" [27]. In this passage we have the idea of an Īśvara, whose activity consists, among other things, in bringing about the conjunction of the souls with the body and all that pertains to it as well as with the eight states (*bhāvāḥ*) of Buddhi, as is known in the Sāṃkhya texts [28].

A similar idea is also found in another passage of Kauṇḍinya. According to the Pāśupatas, not only the Paśupati but also the Paśus must be eternal [29]. Kauṇḍinya makes the following observation concerning the activity of Paśupati with regard to the origin, preservation and destruction of the Paśus: "They (namely the Paśus) being eternal, (Paśupati) conjoins the same Paśus etc. (with a body), because there are examples, such as wall made of mud and iron. The attainment of existence is called origination (*utpattiḥ*). The preservation (*anugrahaḥ*) which is the result of mutual assistance of the supports (of existence) (*āyatana*) such as persistence of existence (*sthitiḥ*), mode of being (*sthānam*), body and objects of sense, is preservation through the impulsion of Īśvara; separation (of the above-mentioned supports of existence through the will of Īśvara) is the disappearance of existence" [30]. In this passage the three activities usually ascribed to Īśvara — creation, preservation and destruction — are referred to. While the creation or giving existence to beings is said to take place by the conjunction of souls with the adjuncts of bodily existence such as body and objects of the senses, destruction is said to result from their separation from these bodily adjuncts, both these activities being directed by the will of Īśvara.

These passages show, it seems to me, similarity of content with the idea implied in the second proof of the Pāśupatas as related by the author of the Yuktidīpikā. But this similarity does not warrant us to draw the conclusion that the Yuktidīpikākāra refers to the ideas of Kauṇḍinya. It is not impossible that the author of the Pañcārthabhāṣyam was known to the author of the Yuktidīpikā.

The passage dealing with the Vaiśeṣikas is of special interest to the historian of the doctrine of Īśvara in the Vaiśeṣika system. Although the Vaiśeṣika system admitted the existence of Īśvara as the directing cause (*adhiṣṭhātā*) of the creation (*sṛṣṭiḥ*) and destruction (*saṃsāraḥ*) of the universe from the time of Praśastapāda, neither the Vaiśeṣikasūtras nor the Daśapadārthaśāstram of Candramati [31], which are the only works of the school available to us before the Padārthadharmasaṃgraha of Praśastapāda, make any mention of Īśvara. An analysis of the Vaiśeṣikasūtras seems to lead to the conclusion that the early Vaiśeṣika system was conceived without any reference to an Īśvara and that there was neither place for, nor necessity of, an Īśvara in the system for the explanation of reality, as understood and taught by the Vaiśeṣika system. Further the acceptance of Adṛṣṭam as the cause that accounted for all phenomena, for which no natural explanation could be given [32], made it difficult for Īśvara to have a place in the system, so long as the

[27] PABh. 74,7—11: *tāsāṃ vikaraṇo bhagavānīśvaraḥ. kasmāt? dṛkkriyāśaktyor apratighātāt. vikaraṇatvaṃ nāma sthānaśarīrendriyaviṣayādisanniveśena vistaravibhāgaviśeṣataś ca kāryakaraṇākhyābhiḥ kalābhir dharmajñānavairāgyaiśvaryādharmājñānāvairāgyānaiśvaryādibhiś ca kṣetrajñasaṃyojanam.*

[28] Cf. Sāṃkhyakārikā, kā. 23.

[29] PABh. 59,21—60,2.

[30] PABh. 60,2—5: *sati nityatve tāny eva paśvādīni saṃyojayati, mṛllohamayaprākārādivad dṛṣṭāntāt. vṛttilābhaś cotpattir ity ucyate. sthitisthānaśarīrendriyaviṣayādyāyatanānāṃ parasparopakārāc cānugrahaḥ īśvaracodanānugrahaḥ, viyojanaṃ vṛttilopaś ca.* A similar idea is also expressed in Śvet. Up. VI, 5: *ādiḥ sa saṃyoganimittahetuḥ.*

[31] Edited by H. Ui: The Vaiśeṣika Philosophy according to the Daśapadārtha-Śāstra: Chinese Text with Introduction, Translation and Notes, London 1917 (= Oriental Translation Fund, New Series, Vol. XXIV). In the view of Prof. E. Frauwallner, Candramati lived between 450 and 550 A. D. Cf. E. Frauwallner: Candramati und sein Daśapadārthaśāstram (Studia Indologica, Festschrift für Willibald Kirfel zur Vollendung seines 70. Lebensjahres, Bonn 1955), p. 80ff.

[32] Cf. Vaiśeṣikasūtras V, 1, 15; V, 2, 2; V, 2, 4; V, 2, 8; V, 2, 14; V, 2, 19, VI, 2, 15—16. (The edition used is: Vaiśeṣikasūtra of Kaṇāda with the Commentary of Candrānanda, ed. by Muni Śrī Jambuvijayaji, Baroda 1961 (Gaekwad's Oriental Series, No. 136.)

Center for Shaiva Studies, Pondicherry Collection

CC-0. In Public Domain. Digitization by Agam Nigam. Funding Tattva Heritage Foundation, Kolkatta and IKS-MOE

Adṛṣṭam was held to be the ultimate explanation of such phenomena. Hence the doctrine of Īśvara must have been a later addition into the system. Now we have in the passage of the Yuktidīpikā under consideration an explicit and clear testimony of the Yuktidīpikākāra that in the view of the author of the Vaiśeṣikasūtras there was no Īśvara [33].

The Yuktidīpikākāra goes on to show the Vaiśeṣikas, who had accepted the doctrine of Īśvara, that a consideration of the doctrines of their system would reveal the fact that there was no place for an Īśvara there. His arguments can be thus summarised:

1. The author of the Vaiśeṣikasūtras has classified the entire reality into six categories (*padārthāḥ*) [34], in none of which can Īśvara be said to be included [35].

2. If the activity or cessation of activity of the atoms were dependent upon Īśvara, the author of the Sūtras would have mentioned and taught about him before mentioning and enumerating the atoms of the different elements, which enter into activity at the time of creation and cease to be active at the time of destruction. The absence of this teaching about Īśvara in the Vaiśeṣikasūtras cannot be said to be due to the forgetfulness of its author, since it would imply unskilfulness on his part [36].

3. In no part of the Vaiśeṣikasūtras is Īśvara mentioned by name. This silence of the Sūtrakāra cannot be ascribed to any other reason than the fact that he did not accept the existence of an Īśvara [37].

Thus we have in very clear terms the testimony of the author of the Yuktidīpikā to the fact that in the view of the Vaiśeṣikasūtrakāra there was no Īśvara, a testimony that is confirmed by the intrinsic analysis of

[33] YD., 87, 23; 88, 4.

[34] Praśastapāda gives the list of these six Padārthas in his Padārthadharmasaṃgrahaḥ (Chowkhamba Sanskrit Series, No. 61, ed. by Pandit Gopinath Kaviraj, Benares 1930), p. *(ja)* 20, 2—4. In the text of the Vaiśeṣikasūtras handed down by Śaṅkara Miśra the six Padārthas are enumerated in Sūtra I, 1, 4: ... *dravya-guṇa-karma-sāmānya-viśeṣa-samavāyānāṃ padārthānām* ... It is interesting to note that in the reading of the Sūtras as found in the commentary of Candrānada this Sūtra is missing.

[35] YD., 87, 15—23.

[36] Ibid. 87,28—88,2.

[37] Ibid. 88, 2—4.

the Vaiśeṣikasūtras, as we already mentioned, and which is further confirmed by the testimony of other authors such as Śaṅkara, the author of the Śārīrakabhāṣyam [38].

Secondly, in addition to his clear statement and demonstration that the author of the Vaiśeṣikasūtras did not admit the existence of an Īśvara, the Yuktidīpikākāra also informs us about the source, whence the Vaiśeṣikas borrowed their doctrine of Īśvara. In a very concise but clear statement he tells us that "(the doctrine) of the followers of Kaṇāda, that there is an Īśvara, is an innovation of the Pāśupatas" [39]. The Pāśupatas [40], as may be made out from the Pāśupatasūtras, were followers of a religious sect, who devoted themselves specially to certain religious practices and austerities with a view to attain liberation. In course of time a philosophic background was given to these religious practices through the acceptance of the Sāṃkhya-Yoga philosophy, which was modified to fit in with their system. These modifications were all the more necessary, since in the Pāśupata system Īśvara played the most important role, which neither the absolute rejection of Īśvara of the classical Sāṃkhya would have permitted nor the more or less subsidiary role given to Īśvara in the Yoga would have satisfied. With the gaining of the philosophical basis the Pāśupatas seem to have occupied an important position among the religious movements of that time, so that they could influence other systems of thought. According to the Yuktidīpikākāra it was due to the influence of the Pāśupatas that the Vaiśeṣikas accepted Īśvara into their system.

Thirdly, we have in this passage of the Yuktidīpikā the earliest testimony, as far as I know, to the fact that the Vaiśeṣikasūtras II, 1, 18—19 were given a theistic interpretation. In Praśastapāda's Padārthadharmasaṃgraha we have no reference at all to these Sutras. It is

[38] Cf. Brahmasūtra Śāṅkarabhāṣyam by Śrī Śaṅkarāchārya, ed. by Pt. Dundhiraj Sastri (= Kāshī Sanskrit Series, No. 71), pp. 517,13—518,1; 521,10—522,10; 534,7—9.

[39] YD., 88, 5: *evaṃ kāṇādānām īśvaro' stīti pāśupatopajñam etat.*

[40] According to R. G. Bhandarkar the origin of the Pāśupata sect is to be traced back to the second century B. C. Cf. his „Vaiṣṇavism, Śaivism and Minor Religious Systems. Strassburg 1913 (= Grundriß der indo-arischen Philologie und Altertumskunde III, 6), p. 116.

Center for Shaiva Studies, Pondicherry Collection

CC-0. In Public Domain. Digitization by Agam Nigam. Funding Tattva Heritage Foundation, Kolkatta and IKS-MOE

in the Vṛtti of Candrānanda to the Vaiśeṣikasūtras that we have the earliest testimony to the theistic interpretation of these Sūtras in a Vaiśeṣika work. In answer to the Yuktidīpikākāra, who argued that Īśvara could not be considered as included in any of the categories and that consequently there was no Īśvara in the opinion of the author of the Vaiśeṣikasūtras, a theist Vaiśeṣika retorts that the Sūtrakāra did indeed accept the existence of Īśvara on account of the Sūtras: *saṃjñākarmatvam asmad viśiṣṭānāṃ liṅgam. pratyakṣapūrvakatvād vā saṃjñākarmaṇaḥ* [41]. This means that these Sūtras had been interpreted with reference to Īśvara during the time of the Yuktidīpikākāra. Most probably, as the Yuktidīpikākāra himself observes in this context, these Sūtras were originally meant and understood as referring solely to beings of intellectual vision and knowledge superior to ours, such as the Yogins, and not necessarily to Īśvara.

For the history of the development of the doctrine of Īśvara it is useful to gather all the details that can be found in this passage concerning Īśvara. These details are gathered from the passage dealing with the exposition and refutation of the proofs of the Pāśupatas, and consequently the Īśvara doctrine, which we are now going to gather together, is mainly applicable to them.

Īśvara is, first of all, considered as the maker of this visible universe [42]. He not only possesses intelligence like other intelligent beings, but as befitting the maker of the universe, he possesses intelligence of a superior order (*atiśayabuddhiḥ*) [43]. The characteristics of this intelligence are not further entered into. We are told, however, that while in the case of the other intelligent beings the faculty of knowledge comes into being as a result of the evolution of the Pradhānam, that of Īśvara is not dependent upon Pradhānam, but solely on his own will [44]. In addition to his superior knowledge Īśvara possesses omnipotence (*sarvaśaktipracitaḥ*), which is superior to the power of all other intelligent beings [45]

[41] YD., 87, 24—25.
[42] Cf. the two proofs for the existence of Īśvara, YD., 84,28 - 85,6.
[43] YD., 85, 1—2.
[44] Ibid. 85, 11—13.
[45] Ibid. 85, 11—12: *sarvaśaktipracita īśvaraḥ*; 85, 15: *nānyeṣāṃ buddhimatām īśvaratulyā śaktiḥ.*

and is designated by the term *aiśvaryam* [46]. The idea of Īśvara as devoid of a body seems to have been gaining ground at that time [47]. The two outstanding attributes of Īśvara seem to have been his superior kind of knowledge and his supreme power (*aiśvaryam*), the two attributes, which came to characterise Īśvara in the later stage of the development of the Īśvara doctrine under the names of omniscience (*sarvajñatvam*) and supreme power (*aiśvaryam*).

The creative activity of Īśvara consists in bringing this visible world into existence, especially by bringing about the union of the soul with the body. In his activity he does not aim at acquiring any gain (*arthaḥ*), visible or invisible, for himself; being possessed of supreme power (*aiśvaryam*) there is nothing lacking to him or nothing that he can acquire [48]. Although he is said to act not for his personal gain, we are not told anything more about the motive of his activity, such as for example, whether he acts for the sake of the good of the creatures, or for his personal amusement, or because activity belongs to his nature, such as we hear of in the later period [49]. Having no one superior to him [50], he acts independently and free from the impulsion of any other person [51]. But he does not seem to have been absolutely independent of the merit (*dharmaḥ*) and demerit (*adharmaḥ*) of the living beings, since the differences of birth and character were attributed to the merits and demerits of the individual souls [52].

In conclusion it might be said that we find here fundamentally and in germ the important elements of the Īśvara doctrine of the later period. This picture of Īśvara, however, drawn as it is from the stray remarks scattered in the discussion, cannot be considered as fully representative of the Īśvara doctrine of the Pāśupatas of that time; for it is probable

[46] Ibid. 85, 22.
[47] Ibid. 86, 22—25.
[48] Ibid. 85, 20—22.
[49] Cf. v. g. Nyāyavārttikam (Nyāya-Darśanam, Vol. II (Calcutta Sanskrit Series, No. XXIX), p. 949,18—950,2; Padārthadharmasaṃgrahaḥ, p. 277, 29—30 and 278, 9; Vyomavatī, p. 305, 6—14; Nyāyamañjarī (Kāshi Sanskrit Series No. 106), Part I, p. 186, 1—14.
[50] YD., 85, 23: . . . *tadviśiṣṭānupapatteḥ.*
[51] Ibid. 85, 22—23.
[52] Ibid. 86, 1—4.

Center for Shaiva Studies, Pondicherry Collection

CC-0. In Public Domain. Digitization by Agam Nigam. Funding Tattva Heritage Foundation, Kolkatta and IKS-MOE

that the author of the Yuktidīpikā brings into discussion only those points of the Pāśupata doctrine of Īśvara, which he thought necessary or useful for his polemics.

Before we pass on to the translation of the passage of the Yuktidīpikā under consideration, we may sum up the results of our study as follows:

Firstly, we know from this passage that the Pāśupatas had a more or less well defined and developed doctrine of Īśvara at the time of the composition of the Yuktidīpikā.

Secondly, we have here an important testimony concerning the doctrine of Īśvara of the Vaiśeṣikas, namely that in the view of the author of the Vaiśeṣikasūtras there was no Īśvara and that the Īśvara doctrine was later introduced into the system by the Pāśupatas.

Thirdly, we learn from this passage that at the time of the author of the Yuktidīpikā, the Vaiśeṣikasūtras II, 1, 18—19 had been given a theistic interpretation. Most probably this is the earliest testimony we possess concerning the theistic interpretation of these Sūtras.

III. Translation (Yuktidīpikā, p. 84,24—88,5)

Now also that suspicion, that the universe comes into existence from the Puruṣa, is also not correct [53]. Why? Because of its rejection. (In the Kārikā) "And on account of the contrast with that ..." [54], we shall demonstrate that the Puruṣa is not a doer (*kartā*).

The same principle (of argument) is to be recognised also in refuting Īśvara as cause (of the universe), since he is not different from the Puruṣa (with regard to his being a doer).

There exists such an Īśvara [55], say the Pāśupatas and the Vaiśeṣikas. For what reason?

Because a special product has a superior intelligence as cause. Here (in this world) a special product such as palace, chariot etc., is observed to have a superior intelligence as cause. And there is this special product characterised through arrangements such as elements, sense organs and living creatures. Hence it also must have a superior intelligence as cause. He who is this cause is the Īśvara. Hence there exists Īśvara.

Besides, there is another (argument): Because the conjunction of a conscious (*cetana*) being with a non-conscious (*acetana*) being is effected by a conscious being, as for example, (the conjunction) of ox and cart. And there is such a conjunction of conscious and non-conscious beings, (namely) of soul and body. Hence it also should be effected by a conscious being [55a]. He, by whom it is effected, is Īśvara. Hence there exists Īśvara as cause (of the visible universe).

Our answer is:

With regard to your statement that the existence of Īśvara is proved on account of the fact that a special product has as cause a superior intelligence, we reply: No.

Because it is to be proved. It is to be proved, whether palace etc. have as cause (only) intelligent beings like us, or have as cause a superior intelligence. Hence it is no answer.

Further, because there is no intellect (*buddhiḥ*) prior to the activity of the prime matter (*pradhānam*) [56]. Since all other causes are excluded [57], the special product, which has an intelligent cause, would have to be

---

[53] Cf. YD., 82, 4; 82, 10.

[54] Sāṃkhyakārikā, kā. 19.

[55] i. e. an Īśvara who is cause of the universe.

[55a] It is to be borne in mind that *cetanatvam* is a specific attribute of the *puruṣaḥ*, and hence does not at all belong to the domain of the *pradhānam*, as is the case of *buddhiḥ*, *ahaṃkāraḥ* and *manas*.

[56] According to Sāṃkhya that which first comes into being in the process of evolution of the Pradhānam is the *buddhiḥ*, which is also called *mahat* or *mahān*. Vgl. Sāṃkhyakārikā, kā. 22. Vgl. also YD., 103, 20—21.

[57] The classical Sāṃkhya conceives the entire reality as composed of two ultimate principles, — *pradhānam* and *puruṣaḥ*, — which, although diametrically opposed to each other in their attributes (Cf. YD., 150, 18—21: *anyā prakṛtis triguṇā, kāraṇabhūtā, kāryabhūtā, kāryakāraṇabhūtā, akāryakāraṇabhūtā, acetanā, paratantrā ceti. anyaḥ puruṣo nirguṇaḥ, na kāryam, na kāraṇam, na kāryakāraṇam, tadviparītaḥ cetanaḥ svatantraś ceti*), are related to each other in such a way that the visible universe comes into being due to their conjunction. But as the Puruṣa is by nature a passive spectator and remains absolutely unchanged (*kūṭasthaḥ*), no causality whatever can be predicated of him. Causality is possible only in the domain of Pradhānam. Cf. Note 8.

Center for Shaiva Studies, Pondicherry Collection

CC-0. In Public Domain. Digitization by Agam Nigam. Funding Tattva Heritage Foundation, Kolkatta and IKS-MOE

produced from the prime matter. And we hold that prior to the evolution of the prime matter, there is no intellect (*buddhiḥ*) at all.

If you say: "On account of the possession of (special) powers (the intellect comes into being in the case of the superior intelligent being) of its own self", perhaps you mean this: "Īśvara is endowed with omnipotence [58]. There is (therefore) no contradiction in the fact that intellect is present in him even prior to the evolution of the prime matter, of its own self, through his will (*icchā*)" [59].

Also this cannot be accepted. Why? Because there is no example (*dṛṣṭāntaḥ*). What example have you for it, that the intellect (comes into existence) of its own self, if you are asked for one? Hence this is not correct [60].

If you would say: "There is no fault (in this) on account of the peculiar powers (of Īśvara)", perhaps you mean: "The other intelligent beings do not possess power similar to that of Īśvara. Hence in their case intellects arise from the prime matter (*pradhānam*) either simultaneously with the dispositions of the parts of the body, or through the contact with the soul etc., but the intellect of Īśvara (comes into being) of its own self".

This too cannot be accepted. Why? Because there would follow the possibility of proving any doctrine, if one declares that, he who brings forward a case contrary to the example (of the proof) and makes objection, should keep in mind that there is (in the case in question) a special power [61]. Hence this is a mere supposition (*ūhaḥ*).

Thus if the intellect of Īśvara cannot come into existence of itself, then it is right to say, that on account of the absence of intellect prior to the activity of the prime matter, this special product does not have an intelligent being as cause.

Further, it is not fitting (that Īśvara acts) in view of a fruit. Intelligent beings are observed to construct special products like palace, chariot etc. with a view to visible or invisible fruit [62]. This is vitiated by the fact of the supreme power (*aiśvaryam*) of Īśvara [63].

Further, there is no director (*prayojakaḥ*) possible. Intelligent beings are observed to construct special products under the direction of another (who directs them). This is not possible in the case of Īśvara, since it is impossible that there is anyone superior to him [64].

Further, because (your argument) is not absolutely conclusive: for not every special product has an intelligent cause, since trees etc. come into being without it. On the assumption that everything has the intellect of Īśvara as cause, there is no example (*dṛṣṭāntaḥ*), and there cannot be an argument (*vādaḥ*) without an example. Hence on account of the lack of absolute conclusiveness the perceptible world (*vyaktam*) does not have an intelligent being as its cause [65].

---

[58] The Pāśupatas hold that Īśvara possesses the power to be present everywhere (*vibhuśaktiḥ*), PABh. 5, 18), eternal and unlimited power of knowledge (*jñānaśaktiḥ*, PABh. 5, 19—20; 127, 1—3), power of dominion over things (*prabhuśaktiḥ*, PABh. 5, 21) and power of causality (*kāraṇaśaktiḥ*, PABh. 72, 3—4, also mentioned as *kriyāśaktiḥ*, PABh. 148, 13—14). The *śaktiḥ* of Īśvara is eternal (*sanātanī*, PABh. 61, 3). His powers of knowledge and action are everywhere present (*jñānakriyayor vibhutve* . . . PABh. 47, 14).

[59] What is meant is that since Īśvara is omnipotent and since he has a will, he can cause his *buddhiḥ* by an act of his will without having any recourse to Pradhānam.

[60] Very great importance was attached to the *dṛṣṭāntaḥ* at the time of the author of the YD. The *dṛṣṭāntaḥ* was an object which possessed the quality to be proved (*sādhyam*) and hence it served as a means of logical connection between the proving reason (*hetuḥ*) and that which is to be proved (*sādhyam*). The great importance attached to the *dṛṣṭāntaḥ* by the author of the YD is clear also from the fact that he often disregards the arguments of his opponents on the ground that they do not have an example. Cf. YD., 85, 13—14; 85, 17—18; 85, 25 (*na cāsty anudāhṛto vādaḥ*), 86, 25—27.

[61] For a similar kind of argument. Cf. YD., 60, 27—29.

[62] Every action is said to be undertaken for some purpose or other, namely in view of some happiness (*sukham*) to be attained, or some pain (*duḥkham*) to be avoided. Actions in view of invisible fruits are, for instance, sacrifices and offerings for the attainment of heaven etc.

[63] What is meant is, that Īśvara possesses already all that can ever be attained and so he cannot be said to act in order to attain something.

[64] The YDkāra assumes that every activity of constructing special products presupposes some one at the top who commands and directs the entire activity of all those taking part in it.

[65] For an absolutely conclusive argument it is necessary that there should be an example (*dṛṣṭāntaḥ*) to verify the truth of the thesis and that there are no cases of exception, which would invalidate or at least limit the general validity of the proving reason (*hetuḥ*). If the proving reason admits exceptions it incurs the defect of not being absolutely conclusive or *anaikāntika*.

Center for Shaiva Studies, Pondicherry Collection

CC-0. In Public Domain. Digitization by Agam Nigam. Funding Tattva Heritage Foundation, Kolkatta and IKS-MOE

Further (an intelligent being is not the cause), because of the predominance of pain (in this world). If this special product had an intelligence as cause, its maker would not have had any purpose in creating an excess of pain. And since he is (said to be all-) powerful, he would have created (the world) with more happiness (*sukham*) (than pain). But this (special product, namely the world) has a predominance of pain. Hence it is not a special product having an intelligent cause [66].

Further, (an intelligent being is not the cause) because of the difficulty of attaining (one's aims). If this special product had an intelligent cause, the attainment of religious merit (*dharmaḥ*), wealth (*arthaḥ*), pleasure (*kāmaḥ*) and liberation (*mokṣaḥ*) [67] would have been easy. But they are difficult to attain. Hence this special product (namely the world) has not for cause an intelligent being.

If you would say: "This (namely the preponderance of pain and the difficulty of attaining the human ends) is no fault of Īśvara, because merit (*dharmaḥ*) and demerit (*adharmaḥ*) are the cause of it", perhaps you mean: "Even though this special product has Īśvara for its cause, yet through the acquirement of merit and demerit by living beings like us, who were created at the time of the first creation with a preponderance of happiness, there results the association (of living beings) with lower, middle and superior (grades of) age, caste and character etc., and consequently this is no fault of Īśvara" [68].

[66] The existence of evil or pain (*sukham*) as irreconcibble with the assumption of an all-powerful and merciful creator has been brought forward by the opponents of theism not only in the western philosophy, but also in Indian philosophy by almost all the early opponents of the Īśvara doctrine.

[67] These are the four *puruṣārthāḥ* for the attainment of which human activity is ultimately directed.

[68] In the Pāśupata system, as exposed in the PABh., Īśvara is said to be absolutely independent of the Karma of the individuals in his activity. Cf. PABh. 60, 14—16: *akarmāpekṣitvaṃ cāsyāta eva siddham. karmakāminaś ca maheśvaram apekṣante, na tu bhagavān īśvaraḥ karma puruṣaṃ vāpekṣate. ato na karmāpekṣa īśvaraḥ.* It is possible that some Pāśupatas hold the view that Īśvara was dependent on the Karma of individual souls. In Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika Īśvara was held to be dependent on the Karma of souls (v. g. Nyāyavārttikam, p. 949, 5—17; Padārthadharmasaṃgrahaḥ, p. 278,23—279,4), whereby they could in some way reconcile the existence of unhappiness and pain in the world with the omnipotence and mercy of the creator.

This is also not right. Why? Because there is no reason for the origination of demerit. If Īśvara had dominion over merit and demerit, he would have brought into existence only merit, that (alone) being for the living beings the cause of happiness, (but) no demerit, there being no use of it (for the living beings). But if it be supposed that merit and demerit originate from their causes naturally (without the activity of an intelligent being), then there arises a contradiction in that statement (of yours), that every evolved being (*vyaktam*) has for cause the intelligence of Īśvara. Hence Īśvara is not the cause (of the visible universe).

And with regard to what has been said (by you), namely that Iśvara exists, "because the conjunction of a conscious being with a non-conscious being is effected by a conscious being" [69], we reply:

This is wrong. Why? Because it is to be proved. By which conscious being is effected this conjunction of conscious and non-conscious beings such as of ox and cart? By what wonder is the conjunction of his body [70] said to be effected by a conscious being? [71]

And (if you would say): "The soul, who is the director (*upadraṣṭā*) of the body and who is designated (by us) by the name of 'Caitra' is acknowledged as the producer (*kartā*) of it" [72].

---

[69] YD., 85, 3.

[70] YD., 86, 11. I read *kāryakaraṇayoḥ*. The expression *kāryakaraṇam* is used in Sāṃkhya to denote an animate body. Kāryam consists of the five *aviśeṣāḥ* (= Tanmātras) and the five *viśeṣāḥ* (= the five elements that are evolved from the five Tanmātras, namely *ākāśaḥ, vāyuḥ, tejaḥ, āpaḥ* and *pṛthivī*) (Cf. YD., 133, 22—23; 140, 17—141, 4; Sāṃkhyakārikā, kā. 38). Karaṇas are thirteen in number and are enumerated in Sāṃkhyakārikā, kā. 32. They consist of the five *karmendriyāṇi*, (*vāk, pāṇiḥ, pādaḥ, pāyuḥ, upasthāḥ*) the five *buddhīndriyāṇi* (*karṇaḥ, tvak, cakṣuḥ, rasanaḥ, nāsikā*) and the three *antaḥkaraṇāni* (*buddhiḥ, ahaṃkāraḥ, manas.*). (Cf. Sāṃkhyakārikā kā. 26 and 32). A similar enumeration of Kāryas and Karaṇas is also found in PABh. 74, 2—7. As the human body is composed of these Kāryas and Karaṇas the expression *kāryakaraṇam* is used for the body. The use of this term in this sense is very frequent in the PABh. v. g. 74, 8; 76, 8; 141, 21.

[71] YD., 86, 10—11. The reading of the text is faulty, as far as I can judge of it. Perhaps a possible reading would be: *yadvaicitryeṇa tasya kāryakaraṇasaṃghātācetanyam.* Are some words or lines missing here?

[72] YD., 86, 11—12. I read: *atha caitraśabdavācyasya piṇḍasyopadṛṣṭā kṣetrajñaḥ tatkartā iṣyate.* Another possible reading might be: ... *piṇḍasyopadṛṣṭā kṣetrajñaḥ, tatkṛta (abhisaṃbandhaḥ) iṣyate.*

Center for Shaiva Studies, Pondicherry Collection

CC-0. In Public Domain. Digitization by Agam Nigam. Funding Tattva Heritage Foundation, Kolkatta and IKS-MOE

(We answer): That is not right, since it is to be proved. For the agency (*kartṛtvam*) of the soul (*puruṣaḥ*) is not admitted by us [73]. Discussion must be carried on with (premisses) that are accepted by both the parties.

Further, because there would follow a *regressus in infinitum*. He who asserts that the conjunction of a conscious being with a non-conscious being is effected by a conscious being, has to admit that the conjunction of the body [74] of Īśvara (with his soul) is effected by a conscious being, but at the same time there follows a *regressus in infinitum*.

And in order that such a fault may not arise, if you would assume that the conjunction with a body is connatural in the case of Īśvara,

(we answer): No, in that case the proving reason (*hetuḥ*) does not lead to a certain conclusion (*anaikāntikaḥ*) [75].

If you would say: "(Our argument) is not faulty, because of their intelligence (*ācetanyam*)", perhaps you mean this: "Īśvara possesses body and it has intelligence; so also is Īśvara. Hence you cannot bring it forward as a counter-example for the case of the conjunction (of a conscious being with a non-conscious being)" [76].

(We answer): This is not right. Why? Because it would follow that there is no conjunction (between them). (For example) there is no conjunction of one soul with another soul, (although) they do not differ in being conscious. In the same way there would not be conjunction between Īśvara and his body. But this is not acceptable (to you).

Further, there would follow that there is no opposition between them. For a person who asserts that both are conscious, just as the intellect (*buddhiḥ*) etc. are the instruments of Īśvara, in the same way Īśvara would also be the instrument of intellect etc. Why? Because there is no difference (between the two, since both are said to be conscious). But this is not acceptable (to you).

If you would say: "If it is so, both are not conscious; for we do not admit that Īśvara has a body, and (hence) there is no fault (in our doctrine) [77]. Those who acknowledge the substance (called) Īśvara, teach that he is possessed of infinite marks such as being all-pervasive [78], devoid of parts [79], of infinite power [80], the subtlest among the subtle [81], the biggest among the big [82], the subject of merit [82a], eternal [83] etc. Why, then, should one attach a body [84] (to him) and falsely attribute it to him?"

(We answer): This too is not correct. Why? Because it contradicts (your own) argument. If Īśvara is such (i. e. bodiless), then (your) argument that (Īśvara exists) "because a special product has a superior intelligence as cause" and that "because the conjunction of a conscious being with a non-conscious being is effected by a conscious being" [85] is contradicted. Why? Because so far has not been observed such (a bodiless) being having such activity (namely, effecting special products or conjoining conscious beings with non-conscious beings). Or if this be admitted (that Īśvara has no body), then the assuming of a form (*mūrtiḥ*) (by Īśvara) would be contradicted. If Īśvara is absolutely of

[73] Cf. Note 8.

[74] YD., 86, 14. I read *kāryakaraṇayoḥ*.

[75] YD., 86, 16. The *hetuḥ* will be *anaikāntikaḥ* since there would be an exception to the general statement that the conjunction of a conscious being with a non-conscious being is effected by a conscious being.

[76] YD., 86, 16—17: *īśvarasya kāryakaraṇaṃ, tadapi cetanam, īśvaro'pi tasmāt saṃbandhe na pratyudāharaṇam upapadyata iti.*

[77] YD., 86, 22: I read *kāryakaraṇavattā*. The problem whether Īśvara possesses a body or not seems to have been posed already in the early stages of the Īśvara doctrine. Among the Pāśupatas, however, the tendency seems to have been to consider Īśvara as essentially bodiless (*amanaḥ, vikalaḥ, niṣkalaḥ*, PABh. 76, 5—17; 128, 8—10). If he was considered as possessing a body (*sakalaḥ*), then the term was used rather in a metaphorical sense (*upacaryā*, PABh. 76, 8).

[78] Cf. Śvet. Up. I, 16; III, 11; III, 14; III, 16; IV, 10; Katha Up. II, 22.

[79] Cf. Śvet. Up. III, 17 (*sarvendriyavivarjitaḥ*); VI, 19 (*niṣkalaḥ*); Katha Up. II, 22 (*aśarīraḥ*).

[80] Cf. Śvet. Up. VI, 8; PABh. 5, 19.

[81] Cf. Śvet. Up.; III, 9; IV, 14; Katha Up. II, 8; II, 20.

[82] Cf. Śvet. Up. III, 9; Katha Up. II, 20.

[82a] Cf. Śvet. Up. VI, 6.

[83] Cf. Śvet. Up. V, 13; VI, 13; Katha Up. II, 18—19.

[84] YD., 86, 24. I read: *kāryakaraṇam avalambya*.

[85] These are the two proving reasons (Hetus) brought forward by the Pāśupatas for the existence of Īśvara. Cf. YD., 84, 28—29 and 85, 3.

Center for Shaiva Studies, Pondicherry Collection

CC-0. In Public Domain. Digitization by Agam Nigam. Funding Tattva Heritage Foundation, Kolkatta and IKS-MOE

such a (bodiless) form, then the assuming of bodily form out of earth etc. (which is spoken of in the sacred texts) would be contradicted.

Further, there is another (reason). Because of the revelation. Revelation too declares that he has a body (through expressions such as) "covered with a skin", "with a hand holding the Pināka-bow", "having his bow drawn to is full stretch", "having black tufts of hair" etc. [86].

If you would say: "By accepting these (appellations of Īśvara to be true) your own assertion (*pakṣaḥ*), (namely that there is no Īśvara) would be contradicted", probably you mean: "If on account of the words of revelation an Īśvara possessing a bodily form would be accepted, thereby is his existence proved. Why? Because that which is not existent cannot possess a bodily form".

(We answer): This too is wrong. Because you do not understand our view. We do not absolutely object to the special power of a divine being; for we admit (the existence of) glorious bodies (*māhātmyaśarīrāṇi*) [87] etc. Our opinion is this, that there is no such mover (*prayoktā*) distinct from the prime matter and the soul [88], as it is asserted by you,

[86] *kṛttivāsāḥ*, *pināka*hastaḥ, *vitataḍhanvā* (YD., 87, 1: *avitataḍhanvā* is a mistake), *nīlaśikhaṇḍī* are epithets of Rudra-Śiva found in the Saṃhitās as well as later in the works of authors like Kālidāsa.

[87] The *māhātmyaśarīrāḥ* are a kind of divine beings that come into existence at the beginning of creation. Their bodies are not generated through parents, but are produced from the Pradhānam of themselves (*sāṃsiddhikam*). While those beings, in whom the Sattva-element predominates, are called Paramarṣis, those in whose body the Rajas-element predominates, are called Māhātmyaśarīras. (YD. 88, 21—23: ... *tatra yasya sattvapradhānaṃ kāryakaraṇam, sa paramarṣiḥ. yasya sattvaṃ rajobahulaṃ sa māhātmyaśarīraḥ.*). Just as knowledge (*jñānam*) is connatural to the Paramarṣis due to the predominance of the Sattva-element in them, supreme power (*aiśvaryam*), resulting from the predominance of the Rajas-element, is connatural to the Māhātmyaśarīras. (The Rajas-element is the source of all activity) (YD. 148, 22—32). Their power seems to consist in being able to bring beings into existence according to their will, just as Maheśvara is said to have created several thousands of Rudras by mere thought or power of will (*abhimānam*) (YD., 149, 9—12). Brahmā and Hiraṇyagarbha are said to be Māhātmyaśarīras. (YD. 152, 9—15; 164, 7—8). Cf. also P. Chakravarti: Origin and Development of the Sāṃkhya System of Thought, Calcutta 1952 (= Calcutta Sanskrit Series, No. XXX), pp. 222—226.

[88] Vgl. YD., 85, 22—23. The classical Sāṃkhya admits only two principles, *pradhānam* and *puruṣaḥ*. Later on Īśvara was accepted as a third principle. Cf. Śaṅkara's Bhāṣyam to Brahmasūtra II, 2, 37 (p. 566, 14—15).

and hence there is opposition of it (with your view). Hence the conjunction of prime matter and soul is not effected through another (third being like Īśvara).

Further, there is another (difficulty). Because of the impossibility (of effecting this conjunction); (for) he who effects this conjunction of the soul (with the body) might do so either with the body itself or with the causes of the body. What follows thence? But he does not make (this conjunction of the soul) with the body itself. Why? Because there would be no efficient cause in the origination of the body, which (in that case) would be independent (of an efficient cause); nor (does he make this conjunction of the soul) with the cause of the body, because it is all-pervading [89]. (Only) the conjunction of limited things like ox and cart is effected by another; prime matter (*pradhānam*) and soul (*puruṣaḥ*), on the contrary, are all-pervading.

Further, (the conjunction of prime matter and soul by Īśvara is impossible), because a conjunction is made for the sake of another [90]. It is observed that the conjunction of ox and cart is made for the sake of another, but the conjunction of prime matter and soul is not for the sake of another.

If you would say: "It is for the sake of Īśvara".

(We answer): No, because it has (already) been said. It has been said already at the beginning [91], that it is impossible for Īśvara to have a purpose, visible or invisible [92].

Such, indeed, is the fault of the Pāśupatas in accepting Īśvara (as cause of the universe).

[89] The Pradhānam like the Puruṣa is all-pervasive (*vyāpī*). Cf. Sāṃkhyakārikā, kā. 10.

[90] Vgl. Sāṃkhyakārikā, kā. 17. The existence of Puruṣa is proved from the fact that a conjunction or combination (*saṃghātaḥ*) such as that of the body, is for the sake of another, namely the Puruṣa. Cf. YD., 93, 8—94, 9.

[91] YD., 85, 20—22.

[92] With this the argumentation against the proofs of the Pāśupatas is brought to a conclusion. The next line of the YDkāra makes this expressly clear.

Center for Shaiva Studies, Pondicherry Collection

CC-0. In Public Domain. Digitization by Agam Nigam. Funding Tattva Heritage Foundation, Kolkatta and IKS-MOE

This is the fault also of the Vaiśeṣikas [93].

Furthermore, it is impossible to consider (Īśvara) as included or not included in the categories (*padārthāḥ*) like substance (*dravyam*) etc. They (namely, the Vaiśeṣikas) admitting Īśvara consider him either as belonging to the (categories of) substance, quality, motion, generality, particularity and inherence [94], or as being another category (outside of these six). And what follows therefrom ? He cannot indeed be (considered as being) substance etc. Why ? Because substance is of two kinds: composite substance and simple substance [95]. Of these Īśvara is not a composite substance, because there would follow the imperfections (*doṣāḥ*) that he is produced etc. [96]; nor is he a simple substance, because (the simple substances) have been enumerated [97]. Your doctrine is that there are only nine substances, beginning with earth and ending with mind (*manas*), because the term *iti* has the meaning of completion (in an enumeration) [98].

Further, because (if Īśvara were a substance) (his) quality (*guṇaḥ*) and activity (*karma*) would have been mentioned. If Īśvara were a substance, the Ācārya would have made a mention of his special quality (*vaiśeṣikaguṇaḥ*) [99], and if he were capable of directing other causes, he would have mentioned his (Īśvara's) activity. But (the Ācārya) has not done so. Hence (Īśvara) is not substance, quality etc. [100]. For the categories of quality etc. are dependent upon a substratum (for their existence) [101]. Thus (Īśvara) does not belong to (the categories like) substance etc.; nor is he another category (*padārthaḥ*) (of his own); for, if he were a category (of his own, the Ācārya) would have mentioned his characteristic marks (*lakṣaṇam*), as he did in the case of the substance etc. But the Ācārya has not mentioned it. Hence in the view of the Sūtrakāra an Īśvara does not exist.

If you would say: "On account of the characteristic mark (*liṅgāt*) etc.", you mean probably: "The activity of giving names is the characteristic mark of people, who are superior to us, because the activity of giving names is preceded by the perception (of the thing named)" [102]. The acceptance of Īśvara by the Ācārya is proved from (his acceptance of) this characteristic mark".

(We answer): That is not right. Why ? It might be your wish, but it is not proved [103]. It is true that by means of such a characteristic mark, there can be ascertainment of some kind of person, who possesses special powers, such as beings with glorious body (*māhātmyaśarīrāḥ*), or some other (similar) beings. But such a being (as Īśvara), who is independent, one and the cause of the activities of creation and destruction of all causes, as you intend to prove from the mere (activity of giving) names, cannot be ascertained from this characteristic mark [103a].

Further, there is another (reason). If (Īśvara is) not taught earlier (in the text), there would follow that (the Sūtrakāra) is unskilful [103b].

---

[93] This line makes us conclude that the two proofs adduced by the Pāśupatas were, in some manner, accepted by the Vaiśeṣikas.

[94] These are the six Padārthas of the classical Vaiśeṣika system.

[95] Cf. Vaiśeṣikasūtras I, 1, 8; II, 1, 11; III, 1, 13; IV, 1, 7. *adravyam* means a substance having no inherent cause (*samavāyikāraṇam*) and thus indicates substances that are not composite. *anekadravyam*, on the other hand, means a substance which is composed of more than one simple substance.

[96] Every composite substance (*anekadravyam*) is produced from the simple substances out of which it comes into being.

[97] Vaiśeṣikasūtra I, 1, 4.

[98] Ibid. I, 1, 4: .... *mana iti dravyāṇi*.

[99] After giving the characteristic marks (*lakṣaṇam*) of the various categories (Padārthas), the author of the Vaiśeṣikasūtras deals with the substances mentioning the *viśeṣaguṇaḥ* of each. Cf. Adhyāyas II and III of the Vaiśesikasūtras.

[100] i. e. he is none of the Padārthas.

[101] YD., 87, 21—22: Correct reading: *āśrayaparatantrā hi guṇādayaḥ padārthāḥ*. Vgl. Vaiśeṣikasūtra I, 1, 15: *dravyāśrayī*; I, 1, 16 and 17.

[102] Cf. Vaiśeṣikasūtras II, 1, 18—19. These Sūtras, as they are quoted in the YD run: *saṃjñākarmatvam asmadviśiṣṭānāṃ liṅgam. pratyakṣapūrvakatvād vā saṃjñākarmaṇaḥ*. In Śaṅkara Miś·a's commentary to the Vaiśeṣikasūtras they read: *saṃjñākarma tv asmadviśiṣṭānāṃ liṅgam. pratyakṣapravṛttatvāt saṃjñākarmaṇaḥ*. Candrānanda's commentary has the following reading: *saṃjñākarma tv asmadviśiṣṭānāṃ liṅgam. pratyakṣapūrvakatvāt saṃjñākarmaṇaḥ*. The reading given by Candrānanda is to be preferred, because it preserves in any case an older tradition than in the reading as handed down by Śaṅkara Miśra. The *vā* in the reading as found in the YD seems to be a mistake.

[103] What is meant is: Although you desire very much to prove the acceptance of Īśvara by the author of the Vaiśeṣikasūtras, still your arguments are far from convincing.

[103a] YD., 87, 28: I read: ... *iṣyate, tathā nāsmal liṅgāt pratipattiḥ*.

[103b] YD., 87, 29: Correct reading: *prāg anupadeśe akauśalaprasaṅgāt*.

Center for Shaiva Studies, Pondicherry Collection

CC-0. In Public Domain. Digitization by Agam Nigam. Funding Tattva Heritage Foundation, Kolkatta and IKS-MOE

If the activity and the cessation of activity of the atoms were dependent on Īśvara, (the Sūtrakāra) would have referred to him earlier (in the text), as (he did) in the case of merit (*dharmaḥ*) [104]; or (otherwise) one would have to conclude that the Sūtrakāra is unskilful, because he did not mention earlier an important substance (like Īśvara). Neither of these is acceptable to you.

Further, there is another (reason). Because no mention (is made of him). In no passage of (your) Śāstram [105] is this Īśvara spoken of by the Ācārya. And there would not have resulted any impropriety in (mentioning) him by name, as would be the case, if a newly married woman were to mention by name her father-in-law [106]. This (doctrine of Īśvara) is wrongly attributed to the Ācārya in order to put a share of your fault on him, but (in truth) it is not his view [107]. Thus (the doctrine) of the followers of Kaṇāda, that there exists an Īśvara, is an invention (*upajñam*) of the Pāśupatas.

Hence Īśvara too is not the cause (of the visible universe).

[104] Before defining *dharmaḥ* (Vaiśeṣikasūtra 1, 1, 2), on which *abhyudayaḥ* and *niḥśreyaḥ* are said to depend, the Sūtrakāra mentions *dharmaḥ* in the preceding Sūtra.

[105] Śāstram here stands for the basic body of teaching of the system, namely the Vaiśeṣikasūtras.

[106] The mentioning of the name of the father-in-law by the newly married bride was considered, according to the older traditions of Indian families, improper and a sign of lack of respect.

[107] Here the YDkāra affirms once again (cf. also YD., 87, 23) that the author of the Vaiśeṣikasūtras did not at all admit an Īśvara, but that the later Vaiśeṣikas, after accepting the Īśvara doctrine into the system, attributed this doctrine of Īśvara to the Sūtrakāra himself, only for the sake of thus exonerating themselves at least partially from the fault (fault, at least in the view of the YDkāra) of admitting Īśvara.

RELATIONS OF EARLY ADVAITINS TO VAIṢṆAVISM

By Paul Hacker

(The main points of the following article date back to a paper which I read before the Indological Section of the German Orientalists' Conference in Tübingen in 1949.)

After G. A. Jacob, who had observed that theistic terms were in Śaṅkara's *Brahmasūtrabhāṣya* often met with in passages where the logic of the system seemed to call for impersonalistic and monistic terms and that Śaṅkara again and again ignored the distinction between *Paraṃ Brahma* and *Īśvara* (cf. G. A. Jacob's edition of the *Vedāntasāra*, 2nd ed., Bombay, 1911, Preface [dating back to 1893], pp. VII ff.), Rudolf Otto in his *Westöstliche Mystik* (2nd ed., Gotha, 1929, pp. 139 ff.) presented a penetrating and elaborate study of the theistic basis or background perceptible in Śaṅkara's monistic thought. The fact brought out in relief by the two scholars marks indeed a feature which is of major relevance to an evaluation of the great thinker's personality and which distinguishes him from other philosophers of his school.

The observation of the theism included in and blended with Śaṅkara's monism raises three questions. The first is about the systematic context of the theism, and this has been treated by Rudolf Otto. Secondly, we have to ask for the historical context or background or the historical causes of the phenomenon. I think that this question can be answered with a fair amount of probability, but I will leave it over for another study. The third question, the answer to which must be given before the second can be investigated, asks for an inquiry into the concrete type of that theistic background. This inquiry I will undertake in the present article.

Devotion, which is more than a philosophical doctrine about God, is in Hinduism usually directed to a definite mythological figure, mostly to Śiva or Viṣṇu or the Goddess. Therefore, if the theistic background of Śaṅkara's monism corresponded to a reality in his life, the question suggests itself as to whether it was of the Vaiṣṇava or Śaiva or of another type. Now it is true that Śaṅkara's main work, the *Brahmasūtrabhāṣya*

Center for Study of Social Sciences, Pondicherry Collection

CC-0. In Public Domain. Digitization by Agam Nigam. Funding Tattva Heritage Foundation, Kolkatta and IKS-MOE

(SBh), does not seem to reveal any preference for a particular deity in direct statements. The theistic background of his philosophy, though undeniable, is not immediately perceptible in its concrete outlines. Nevertheless it must be assumed that Śaṅkara's theism, as a constituent of his personal life, had a concrete shape, conditioned by the family in which he was born or by his environment or by devotional practice, though it was not directly reflected in his writings.

Now it is almost a common opinion, spread in India as well as in the West and frequently stated in books and articles, that the lower storey of the edifice of Śaṅkara's thought included a sanctuary of Śiva. But it appears to me that this opinion was circulated by as late a writer as Mādhava-Vidyāraṇya, the author of the *Śaṅkaradigvijaya*, who on the basis of the mere name Śaṅkara constructed the legend of the *bhāṣyakāra* having been an incorporation of the divine Śaṅkara or Śiva. For I cannot find the slightest trace of any partiality for, or even proximity to, Śaivism in Śaṅkara's main work — and, as I may add, in all those writings which are indubitably or probably his productions. On the contrary, a few indications — not very conspicuous, it is true, and therefore, as far as I can see, not noticed by scholars so far, but nevertheless unambiguous — can be detected in the SBh to show that the Vaiṣṇava religion was, to say the least, more familiar to the author than Śaivism.

Firstly, the name *Śiva* is not used in the SBh. The deity denoted by this word is mentioned under the name of *Rudra* in a passage where myths are cited to substantiate certain statements (3, 3, 32). It is said there that Skanda was generated by Rudra. This is quite an impartial mention, not different from allusions to myths of other gods. No predilection for Śiva can be educed from it. On the contrary, the passage might even imply that the author was not a Śaiva. For as far as I know, Śaivas like to call their supreme deity by his honorific name Śiva, whereas a staunch Vaiṣṇava — who, as such, is *ekāntin* — avoids to use *Śiva* as a proper name, preferring to designate the rival of his supreme god by the name *Rudra*. Moreover, the passage alluded to is the only impartial mention in the SBh of ideas connected with the figure of Śiva. As to the contemporary theology of Śaivism, it is well known

that it is rejected without qualification in the polemical part of Śaṅkara's SBh (2, 2, 37—41).

Conspicuously different, however, is the case of Vaiṣṇavism. Exception made of the passage where the *Pāñcarātra* doctrine is criticized, Viṣṇu is mentioned under this name at least 7 times and once each under the names of *Hari* and *Nārāyaṇa*. Let us now examine these passages. One of them (3, 3, 32) cites a myth, another (3, 2, 17) mentions *Nārāyaṇa* in connection with a *Māhābhārata* verse quoted. Neither of these two passages yields any material utilizable to answer our question. But in Sūtra 1, 2, 7 it is said that God can be made perceptible (*nicāyya*), and in commenting on this passage Śaṅkara says: "It is taught that God, who is characterized by minuteness and other qualities, is perceptible, i. e. visible, in the lotus of the heart, just as Hari is in the *śālagrāma* stone. In this, it is a cognition of the Inner Sense which apprehends him. God, though omnipresent, graciously allows himself to be reverently meditated upon there" (*aṇīyastvādi-guṇôpeta īśvaras tatra hṛdaya-puṇḍarīke nicāyyo draṣṭavya upadiśyate yathā śālagrāme Hariḥ. tatrâsya buddhi-vijñānaṃ grāhakam. sarvagato 'pîśvaras tatrôpāsyamānaḥ prasīdati*). Here the *śālagrāma*, which is a Vaiṣṇava symbol, is referred to as comparable to the heart in which the supreme God is perceptible according to the *sūtra*. Hari is not compared with the *Lower Brahman*, which is constituted by a superimposition of illusory qualities on the Supreme, but with the transcendent *Highest Self*, who cannot become the object of meditation unless contemplated under a symbol. It is the Supreme Self that allows himself to be meditated upon in the heart as Viṣṇu is visualized in the *śālagrāma*. In the same sense Viṣṇu and his *śālagrāma* symbol are mentioned at two other places (1, 2, 14; 1, 3, 14). Furthermore, there are 4 passages (3, 3, 9; 4, 1, 3 twice; 4, 1, 5) where the superimposition of the spiritual vision of Viṣṇu on idols (*pratimā*) is cited as an instance of superimposition of religious ideas on things. In all these seven passages, Śaṅkara could as well have said in general that the vision of a deity is superimposed on a symbol or image or, if he had hailed from a Śaiva environment or had really had a partiality for Śaivism, one would expect him to select the example of the *liṅga*, on which the vision of Śiva is superimposed. Instead, he cites examples

Center for Shaiva Studies, Pondicherry Collection

CC-0. In Public Domain. Digitization by Agam Nigam. Funding Tattva Heritage Foundation, Kolkatta and IKS-MOE

from the cult of Viṣṇu seven times. This must point to a familiarity with the Vaiṣṇava religion, caused either by origin, environment, or other circumstances.

In Śaṅkara's *bhāṣyas* on the *Upaniṣads*, similar cases occur also, as e. g. in Taitt. Up. Bh. 1, 6, 1; 1, 8, 1; Muṇḍ. Up. Bh. 2, 1, 4; Praśna-Up. Bh. 5, 2; Bṛh. Up. Bh. 1, 1, 1; 5, 1, 1; Chānd. Up. Bh. 6, 16, 3; 7, 1, 4; 8, 1, 1. A particularly interesting case is point is his commentary on Gauḍapāda's *Māṇḍūkyakārikā* 4, 1. Gauḍapāda here invokes a *Saṃbuddha*, who is *dvipadāṃ varaḥ*. There cannot be any reasonable doubt that the person meant is the Buddha, the Śākyamuni, since Gauḍapāda's monism owes much to idealistic Buddhism. But Śaṅkara in his commentary — which is certainly authentic, as can be shown by several criteria — attempts to explain away this reverence to the founder of the rival system. Though in another passage of the same commentary (on *kārikā* 4, 99) he frankly admits a proximity of Buddhistic idealism to Gauḍapāda's advaitism, he stresses at the same place, commenting on Gauḍapādas words *nâitad buddhena bhāṣitam*, that his advaitism differs from Buddhistic idealism in recognizing a Supreme Reality, which can be known only from the upaniṣads (*jñāna-jñeya-jñātṛ-bheda-rahitaṃ paramārtha-tattvam advayam etan na buddhena bhāṣitam. yadyapi bāhyârtha-nirākaraṇaṃ jñānamātra-kalpanā câdvaya-vastu-sāmīpyam uktam, idaṃ tu paramârtha-tattvam advaitaṃ vedānteṣv eva vijñeyam*). So he may have thought it impossible that in *kārikā* 4, 1 Gauḍapāda should have payed reverence to the founder of a system in which, though it was akin to his, he found something to criticize in *kārikā* 4, 99. But if the *Saṃbuddha* of *kārikā* 4, 1 is not the Buddha, what person may be denoted by the word? There were many possibilities of interpretation once the most probable one was excluded. So Śaṅkara's option must be significant, because it inevitably must point into the direction of a preference and thus betray a partiality. Now he chose to interpret the *Saṃbuddha* as *Nārāyaṇa* the *Puruṣottama*. This means that he substituted for the Buddha of the original not an abstract Highest Being — which would, by the way, have been difficult on account of the additional words *dvipadāṃ varaḥ* — nor any human teacher, but the supreme deity of a concrete religion, and this religion is no other than that

which we should expect after having examined the SBh, namely Vaiṣṇavism.

A certain proximity to, if not preference for, this religion may perhaps also be reflected in a few cases of names of imaginary persons used by Śaṅkara in exemplifications. The most frequent of them is, of course, *Devadatta*, and if a second person is required, his equally imaginary brother *Yajñadatta* is usually called upon. But there are a few cases of variations, and these again point to the sphere of Vaiṣṇavism, namely *Viṣṇumitra* (2, 2, 28; 3, 2, 7; 3, 4, 20) and *Kṛṣṇagupta* (4, 3, 5).

Now let us cast a glance into the Tarkakāṇḍa. It is true that Śaṅkara rejects the theology of the Vaiṣṇava system of *Pāñcarātra*, but it is worthy of note that his criticism is not so unqualified here as in the case of Śaiva theology. He controverts only the *vyūha* theory of the *Pāñcarātrins* but expressly approves of a considerable part of their system. He admits that in some respects, e. g. in the doctrine of God being the material as well as the efficient cause of the world, this system agrees with his Vedānta (*samānatvān na visaṃvādagocaraḥ*), and he states: "We do not controvert the doctrine that Nārāyaṇa, who is known to be higher than the Unevolved, who is the Supreme Self and the Self of All, has multiplied himself through himself into single forms... Nor do we raise any objection if it is intended to worship the Bhagavān with unceasing concentration of mind by approaching him (probably in his temple) or by other means" (*yat tāvad ucyate yo 'sau Nārāyaṇaḥ paro 'vyaktāt prasiddhaḥ paramātmā sarvātmā sa ātmanâtmānam anekadhā vyūhyâvasthita iti, tan na nirākriyate ... yad api tasya bhagavato 'bhigamanâdi-lakṣaṇam ārādhanam ajasram ananya-cittatayâbhipreyate, tad api na pratiṣidhyate* 2, 2, 42). I think it cannot be overlooked that a marked sympathy for the Vaiṣṇava religion speaks from these words. This sympathy even goes beyond what might be expected from the point of view of strict advaitism. For not only does Śaṅkara stress that the doctrine of God or the Brahman being the material as well as the efficient cause is common to both his system and that of Vaiṣṇavism, but he even identifies the Highest Self as taught by the Advaita system with a figure of mythology, namely with *Nārāyaṇa*, the *Bhagavān*, who is the highest deity of Vaiṣṇavism, and he expressly approves of Vaiṣṇava

Center for Shaiva Studies, Pondicherry Collection

CC-0. In Public Domain. Digitization by Agam Nigam. Funding Tattva Heritage Foundation, Kolkatta and IKS-MOE

134

Center for Shaiva Studies, Pondicherry Collection